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This paper reviews opportunities and challenges of small-scale forestry proponents in the 
Philippines when engaging in carbon markets. The paper defines carbon markets and 
emissions offsets and summarises how planted and natural forests feature in both regulated 
and voluntary carbon markets are currently operating around the world. Three categories of 
constraints are identified for small-scale forestry proponents in the Philippines engaging in 
carbon markets: lack the knowledge and skills across the gamete of complex legal and 
technical issues required to fully engage in carbon markets; that transaction costs involved in 
growing, measuring and commercialising offsets through small-scale forests deter or impede 
engagement in carbon markets; and lack of professional networks with brokers and buyers 
of offsets to achieve an optimal sales price for their offsets. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Carbon markets now encompass a substantial global industry; Capoor and Ambrosi (2008) 
estimated the value of ‘traded carbon’ to have exceeded US$64 billion in 2007. Carbon 
markets also feature as critical parts of the climate change mitigation strategies of many 
countries, and are much talked about for their role in helping to avert the disastrous 
economic, environmental and social implications of ‘business as usual’ climate change. The 
economic rationale for governments to use carbon markets is that individual ‘polluters’ differ 
in their marginal cost of pollution control, and that trading of offsets and permits provides an 
opportunity for polluters to find collectively the least expensive way to achieve environmental 
targets prescribed by governments. In doing so, carbon markets promote innovation in 
finding less expensive ways of reducing pollution, and have appeal as policy instruments 
because they are intended to minimise the cost of pollution control. 
 
In this paper, carbon markets are defined as those markets associated with the trade of 
greenhouse gas emissions offsets and government-issued permits to emit greenhouse 
gases. Further, greenhouse gas emissions offsets are defined as tradeable quanta (in 
tCO2e) of sequestered greenhouse gases or avoided greenhouse gas emissions that can be 
used by organisations to reduce their net reportable gas emissions. The focus is specifically 
on forest-related greenhouse emissions offsets (including both explicit and implicit reporting 
requirements). A forest is defined as an area that is dominated by trees having usually a 
single stem and a mature or potentially mature stand height exceeding 2m and with existing 
or potential crown cover of overstorey strata greater than about 20%. This definition includes 
planted forests and natural forests and woodlands. 
 
The United National Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 
Conference of Parties (COP) of the signatories to the treaty, have been at the centre of the 
international climate change policy debate since 1990. At COP 3 (held in Kyoto, Japan in 
1997) most developed countries agreed to legally binding national greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction targets, and these formed the basis of the Kyoto Protocol (KP). The KP 
also made provisions for the role carbon markets could play in helping nations meet their 
national emissions reductions targets. These KP provisions have formed the basis of most of 
the regulated carbon markets now operating around the world (Hepburn 2007). 
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The KP also included guidelines for how signatory countries to the UNFCCC treaty – which 
were grouped as either Annex I countries (developed countries) or non-Annex I countries 
(developing countries) – could trade offsets between each other. Whilst the guidelines for 
trading offsets between Annex I countries were agreed upon relatively quickly, the guidelines 
for trading offsets between Annex I countries and non-Annex I countries were more 
complicated and controversial. Ensuing negotiations amongst UNFCCC signatories over the 
five years following COP 3 led to the agreement of various flexibility mechanisms which 
allowed Annex I countries to fund emissions reduction activities in non-Annex I countries. 
These flexibility mechanisms included Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects. 
 
Forests have featured prominently in the international climate change policy debate. The role 
of forests as substantial sinks of greenhouse gases is recognised in the principles of Land 
Use and Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) included in the UNFCCC and KP. 
Forests have been included in the discussion on carbon markets as important sources of 
greenhouse gas emissions offsets. Forest-based offsets can be derived from reforestation 
and afforestation activities that sequester greenhouse gas emissions. Forest-based offsets 
can also be derived from avoided greenhouse gas emissions resulting from changed forest 
management practices and from the use of forest products for bioenergy production instead 
of non-renewable energy sources. The measurement and commercialisation of offsets from 
forest-related activities is a complex and often costly process. Many of the constraints to 
forest holders engaging in carbon markets are associated with this process of taking offsets 
‘from forest to market’ (Eliasch 2008). 
 
INTRODUCTION TO REGULATED CARBON MARKETS 
 
A number of regulated carbon markets have evolved concurrently with the international 
climate change policy debate. Table 1 lists these markets and summarises the rules for the 
use of forest-based offsets in the respective markets. These markets include the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS), the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme 
(NZETS), the California Global Warming Solutions Act 2007 (AB-32) and the proposed 
Australian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (the CPRS, a nation-wide initiative proposed 
to succeed the state-based New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme). 
Offsets from forest-based activities feature in all of these schemes, whether as domestic 
afforestation projects in the NZETS, AB-32 and CPRS, or as components of afforestation 
and bioenergy based CDM projects in the EUETS. Notably, one other significant regulated 
carbon market – the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which involves several states in 
the north-east of the USA and an emissions trading scheme – does not recognise forest-
related projects as legitimate offset activities. 
 
There are also a number of mandatory renewable energy use schemes in operation in many 
countries; for example, the Australian Mandatory Renewable Energy Target scheme of 2007 
aims to achieve 20% use of renewable energy in the nation’s total electricity consumption by 
the year 2020. In general, these schemes require electricity retailers to source specific 
proportions of total electricity sales from renewable energy sources according to a fixed 
timeframe. Some schemes include trading systems that allow retailers to buy and sell 
renewable energy permits. Whilst forest products feature as important sources of renewable 
bioenergy in many of the schemes, the schemes do not technically comply with the definition 
of carbon markets used in this article. As such, the constraints on forest holders engaging in 
mandatory renewable energy schemes (which are typically associated with how the 
economics of wood supply affect the financial viability of forest product-based bioenergy 
manufacturing facilities) are not included in this review. 
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Table 1. An overview of how forests feature in various regulated carbon markets 
 
Regulated carbon market Rules for offsets from forests 
European Union Emissions  
Trading Scheme 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) unrestricted, no 
domestic afforestation (within EU), no Reduced 
Emissions from Deforestation or Degradation (REDD) 
New Zealand Emissions  
Trading Scheme 
CDM unrestricted, domestic afforestation, no REDD 
 
California AB-32 Only domestic afforestation, no international forestry 
offset trade permitted, no REDD 
Australian Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme 
No afforestation CDMs permitted, domestic afforestation 
heavily supported, no REDD 
Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (USA) 
No afforestation allowed, no REDD 
 
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKETS 
 
In addition to regulated markets, a number of voluntary carbon markets have emerged, 
including multi-member trading forums such as the Chicago Climate Change (CCX) and 
over-the-counter trades (OTC) between a small number of organisations (usually three or 
four). Forests have also featured prominently in these types of voluntary carbon markets. For 
example, the CCX has included provisions for offsets from afforestation projects in its rules. 
 
Some corporations have provided funding in support of Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) projects in non-Annex I countries on a voluntary 
basis. These constitute so-called voluntary carbon markets. Most of these types of voluntary 
carbon markets have formed organisational arrangements around the projects to measure 
and commercialise emissions offsets. It is debatable whether corporations invest in these 
voluntary markets primarily for emissions reduction benefits or whether they invest for 
broader benefits of corporate social responsibility, corporate image and marketing. 
Regardless, these voluntary markets typically work to support a variety of other ecosystems 
services and social benefits, and hence offer substantial value to multiple stakeholders.  
 
The establishment of regulated carbon markets in developing countries has been limited by 
the capacities of developing country governments to fund the establishment and operation of 
the regulated carbon market trading schemes. Moreover, regulated carbon markets rely on 
the ability of firms that emit large volumes of greenhouse gas emissions to fund the buying 
end of the carbon market value chain. Regulated carbon markets also typically involve a 
substantial impact on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the host country. Developing 
countries and the corporate sector in developing countries typically have relatively low 
capacity to deal with these challenges. Some countries have however developed ‘payment 
for ecosystem service’ (PES) schemes with support from aid agencies (as recently reviewed 
by Lasco and Pulin 2009). 
 
Voluntary carbon markets include a global-over-the counter (OTC) market for carbon offsets 
and a number of voluntary exchange forums, most notably the Chicago Climate Exchange 
(CCX). The CCX is a voluntary market but is subject to self-imposed regulation in the form of 
a cap on emissions, allocation of emissions that are tradable, and permitted offsets. As a 
consequence, CCX credits tend to be relatively commoditized and the market tends to 
operate in a way akin to regulatory markets. The flexibility offered by the voluntary carbon 
market offers two main advantages over regulatory carbon markets, namely lower 
transaction costs and no pre-approvals are required. These features present particular 
advantages for small-scale projects. For example, establishment of CDM carbon offset 
projects must be approved by the UNFCCC’s CDM Executive Board. This is a time-
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consuming process, the cost of which can range from US$50,000 to US$250,000. Further, 
the total upfront costs of a small-scale CDM project have been estimated to account for 
between 14% and 22% of the net present value of the project’s revenue from carbon credits. 
In 2007, voluntary carbon markets grew by 165%. However, the voluntary carbon market 
remains only a small fraction (about 2.2% volume-wide) of the size of the regulatory carbon 
market, which in 2007 transacted over 2959 Mt of carbon dioxide equivalent, valued at over 
US$66.4 billion (Eliasch 2008). 
 
AFFORESTATION CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM PROJECTS 
 
The best opportunity for forest holders from developing countries to sell offsets in regulated 
carbon markets lies in CDM projects. CDM projects are development projects that are 
intended to result in avoiding greenhouse gas emissions and sequestering greenhouse gas 
emissions. CDM projects must also comply with a set of sustainable development criteria. 
Under UNFCCC provisions, CDM projects take place in a non-Annex 1 country and can 
involve project proponents from both non-Annex 1 and Annex 1 countries. In order to use 
CDM in UNFCCC-related regulated carbon markets, CDM projects need to be certified by 
the CDM Executive Board, an organisational unit of the UNFCCC. CDM projects can be of 
various types, including those that involve renewable energy development, less emission-
intensive forms of production and afforestation projects. 
 
In order to use the emissions offset products generated by CDM projects in UNFCCC-
orientated regulated carbon markets (such as the European Union’s Emission Trading 
Scheme, EUETS and the proposed Australian CPRS), CDM projects need to be certified by 
the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB), an organisational unit of the UNFCCC. The relatively 
complicated CDM EB certification process usually takes two years and involves transaction 
costs (such as independent auditing) of between US$50,000 and US$250,000 per project 
(depending on the location, scope and nature of the project). Of the 1000 or so CDM 
projects certified to date by the CDM EB (and of the 4000 or so in the certification ‘pipeline’), 
the clear majority have involved a proponent from an Annex 1 country who has assisted with 
financing the project and technical aspects of the project planning and management. 
 
The avoided or sequestered emissions resulting from CDM projects certified by the CDM 
Executive Board are known as Certified Emission Reduction Units (CERs). One CER is 
equal to one tCO2e of avoided or sequestered emissions. CERs can be traded as offsets in 
a number of regulated carbon markets (e.g. EUETS, the proposed Australian CPRS and the 
New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme). Between 2003 and 2008 the sales price for 
CERs traded in various forums associated with the EUETS ranged from below 1 Euro per 
CER to over 35 Euro per CER. During March 2009, the sales price was approximately 8 
Euro per CER.  
 
To date, CDM projects defined as bioenergy projects have been more common than 
afforestation projects. Wood products from afforestation projects can validly be used as part 
of certified CDM projects. It is unlikely however that wood products from natural forests 
would be accepted as part of certified CDM projects defined as biofuel projects, given 
potential conflicts with accepted conceptualisations of sustainable development in the CDM 
certification process. Afforestation projects can be designed for the exclusive purpose of 
producing wood for use in bioenergy CDM projects. Afforestation projects would need to be 
designed to comply with the additionality provisions of CDM projects. Afforestation projects 
can be used for a variety of types of bioenergy, including both local small-scale fuel use and 
larger industrial level use. To comply with CDM requirements, the projects must supply wood 
products to an energy manufacturer and that energy manufacturer must use those wood 
products as a renewable source of energy instead of using a non-renewable source of 
energy. Afforestation and reforestation CDM projects have been slow to materialize. As of 
December 2007, although many projects were undergoing validation, only one afforestation 
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and reforestation CDM project (in China) had been approved since the commencement of 
the market (FAO 2008; Humphreys 2008). This slow uptake may in part be due to the 
complexity of the rules related to the markets. UNFCCC rules related to afforestation and 
reforestation CDM, due to their technical complexity, took two years longer to negotiate than 
projects in other sectors such as energy (FAO 2008). Once established, it was found that the 
rules were too complex for small-scale projects, and simplified rules and procedures for 
small-scale projects in low-income communities were only recently approved. Another 
reason for slow uptake has been the relatively high transaction costs of afforestation and 
reforestation projects (FAO 2008). In the regulatory carbon market, demand is regulation-
driven and participants are primarily concerned with the least-cost means of meeting their 
allowances. Therefore, the lowest cost offset projects – which are most frequently not 
afforestation and reforestation CDM − tend to dominate the market (Humphreys 2008). 
 
REDUCED EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND DEGRADATION 
 
REDD is not part of any regulated carbon market as yet, although there is talk that it may be 
included within the next five years. So all carbon markets associated with REDD are 
voluntary, that is, they involve a sponsor (typically a corporation or government organisation) 
which pays the forest owner to protect the forest, and whilst the sponsor cannot use the 
'saved' emissions to offset their regulatory-related emissions liabilities, the sponsor can use 
the offsets in their company reports to 'informally' offset emissions and they gain good 
publicity and keep numerous stakeholders happy by 'investing' in an environmentally, 
socially and climate-friendly project. The 'story' behind a REDD project is a key to its 
commercial success in voluntary carbon markets. To demonstrate verifiable carbon benefits, 
REDD projects must design and implement: (1) an initial carbon inventory; (2) a baseline 
(which is a ‘without-project’ scenario for future forecast emissions); (3) continuing carbon 
monitoring; and (4) a transparent measurement verification program. One of the major 
challenges for REDD projects in developing countries in the tropics is the lack of information 
and processes for collecting data in relation to GHG emissions resulting from forest 
changes. The established process to obtain this information at a national level (currently 
primarily for policy and decision-making) is through field-based forest inventories and remote 
sensing technology (FAO 2006b). Whilst this practice is well established in developed 
countries, many developing countries lack resources and institutional capacity (FAO 2006b) 
and therefore tend not to have the necessary data in order to assess the carbon storage 
value and issues of leakage without further assessment and the associated upfront costs. 
 
This limitation also extends to a lack of efficient monitoring and verification capacity.  
Monitoring and enforcement are costly and measurement of carbon sequestration is often 
complex, particularly with respect to assessments of soil organic carbon (Van Kooten and 
Sohngen 2007). A trade-off often occurs between greater accuracy in emission assessments 
and the costs of measuring and monitoring carbon sequestration. Greater accuracy may 
involve the use of more complex models and therefore more complex rules. This may create 
greater scope for manipulation and lead to higher costs of participation in carbon markets, 
which in turn may lead to lower participation and lower efficiency of the market in reducing 
emissions (Karsenty 2008). 
 
‘Permanence’ refers to the possibility of reversal of carbon benefits as a result of: natural 
disturbances such as fires and unusual weather events; lack of reliable guarantees that the 
original deforestation and degradation activities and the associated emissions will not return, 
and uncertainty as to land ownership. Given that many developing countries in the tropics 
have a lack of rule of law and high levels of corruption, and may also have a high degree of 
political instability, the risk that a project will not be permanent can be high. 
 
A number of strategies have been identified to guard against such reversals. Some 
examples include: establishing contingency carbon credits; establishing partial instead of full 
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credits for stored carbon, discounted according to the perceived risk to permanence; 
insurance by the buyer or seller where the insurer will substitute credits from another carbon 
sink at the time of default or the occurrence of fire (Van Kooten and Sohngen 2007); and use 
a rental system for sequestered carbon, where a credit is leased for a finite term. Apart from 
insurance, each of these strategies involves progressive payments for credits arising from 
continued conservation. 
 
‘Leakage’ is the risk that an REDD project will simply lead to increased deforestation outside 
the projects boundary, thereby displacing rather than reducing deforestation. For these 
reasons, leakage is considered a GHG externality. REDD projects are particularly prone to 
leakage because they typically involve the discontinuation or avoidance of an economic 
activity. If no alternative livelihood option is provided to the agents of that activity, this may 
simply lead to a direct displacement of activities to another location (Aukland et al. 2003).   
 
The challenges related to leakage are how to design a project to minimize leakage, how to 
quantify any leakage that does occur, and how to monitor possible leakage. Leakage can be 
anticipated and accounted for and it can also be controlled as part of project design by 
addressing the demands for products or resources (such as fuelwood). Leakage was 
prominent among the concerns of environmental advocacy groups in relation to including 
forest carbon sequestration in the CDM provisions of the Kyoto Protocol (Murray et al. 2004). 
 
A major challenge for REDD projects is how to ensure that sufficient economic incentives for 
conservation are paid to firms, farmers and populations adjacent to forested land who often 
act as agents of deforestation and degradation. In many cases, communities local to tropical 
forests have a tradition of living off the forest resources or have grown accustomed to the 
revenue earned from forest harvesting. If REDD projects restrict access to these forests, the 
projects must incorporate payments to those local communities or create alternative means 
of those communities addressing their livelihood needs over the term of the REDD project. A 
lack of success in designing and implementing these projects will substantially increase the 
risk of lack of permanence and of leakage (Brown et al. 2000). 
 
The exclusion of REDD from the Kyoto Protocol continues to be a highly contentious issue. 
This is not only because of the magnitude of potential benefits from REDD, but also because 
forestry is a major resource for many developing countries, and the exclusion of REDD 
therefore has a substantial impact on the priority given by those developing countries to 
REDD and climate change. The Kyoto Protocol rules currently take account of deforestation 
and degradation  (and therefore also avoided deforestation and degradation) only in that it is 
included in the calculation of annual net GHG emission levels of Annex I countries (i.e. 
developed countries). Avoided deforestation and degradation was however excluded from 
the flexibility mechanisms, most notably the CDM, and therefore avoided deforestation and 
degradation in developing countries essentially continue to have no value under the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
 
There are various reasons why REDD has been excluded from the Kyoto Protocol’s first 
commitment period. These reasons relate to concerns about: (1) whether carbon emitters 
could use forestry-based offsets as a means to avoid making the necessary changes to 
reduce their energy-related emissions (Totten et al. 2003); (2) whether rules to prevent 
leakage and achieve ‘additionality’ could be adequately adhered to by smaller-scale REDD 
projects (Persson and Azar 2007); (3) how the definition of a ‘forest’ in the Kyoto Protocol 
does not adequately accommodate notions of emissions loss through forest degradation 
(Totten et al. 2003); (4) whether sufficient ‘carbon value’ would flow to local beneficiaries; (5) 
the influence of political interests at an international level and (6) whether the magnitude of 
compensation required (to provide sufficient incentive to national governments to not pursue 
land development policies focused on land uses such as intensive agriculture that provide 
higher short-term economic returns) would be economically feasible. These are also issues 
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that are commonly referred to in the debate about climate change policy to criticize the 
authenticity of REDD projects and to cast doubt on whether an emissions credit saved 
through REDD is equivalent to an emissions benefits achieved through more controllable 
climate change mitigation strategies such as emissions reductions. 
 
Considering these issues, in December 2005, at COP11 of the UNFCCC, Papua New 
Guinea and Costa Rica (supported by many developing countries) proposed that emissions 
from avoided deforestation be included in an UNFCCC compensation scheme to provide 
financial incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation. Then in December 2007 at 
COP13 in Bali, the potential inclusion of REDD in an international GHG emission reduction 
regime was a key topic and the resulting ‘Bali Action Plan’ encouraged formally included 
REDD as a potential mechanism for reaching emissions reductions targets. The decision 
relating to inclusion of REDD into the second commitment period will not be made until the 
next COP15 convention in 2009 in Copenhagen. 
 
Despite there being no specific decision made to include REDD at COP13, the endorsement 
of the need to incorporate REDD has sent waves across the voluntary markets (Humphreys 
2008). In anticipation of a decision to include REDD in the post-Kyoto international climate 
regime, a number of countries and organizations have initiated programs to support efforts to 
reduce emissions from deforestation (FAO 2007). These programs aim to provide additional 
sources of funding for REDD projects and are expected to boost the likelihood of REDD 
project development. Examples include the World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund and Community 
Development Carbon Fund, the World Bank’s ‘Forest Carbon Partnership Facility’ 
established in March 2007, the Australian Government’s ‘Global Initiative on Forests and 
Climate’, established in March 2007, and the Government of Norway’s announcement at 
COP13 of its contribution of about US$800 million annually over five years to provide 
support to initiatives that reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation. 
 
REDD projects have in the past typically involved a number of agents. A corporate sponsor 
may agree to purchase a large proportion of the credits generated and may directly fund the 
project or, by agreeing to off-take the carbon credits, underwrite funding by another entity. 
There may be funding support by a development bank or aid agency, or the national 
government of the host country. The local community and NGOs may provide funding, and 
often participate by providing services and people to carry out related extension work. These 
types of investors in carbon markets are likely to be motivated by a mix of reasons, including 
the desire to profit, the desire to reduce their exposure to corporate risk arising from current 
or future climate-change-related regulations, and the desire to contribute to and support the 
broader ecosystem service and social benefits of an activity such as REDD (Coomes et al. 
2008). Bayon et al. (2007) argued that investors in carbon markets look for ‘carbon’ that will 
give them the greatest political, public relations or ethical return for their investment. In this 
sense, investors’ preferences in carbon markets appear to be for ‘positive story’ projects that 
are non-controversial but charismatic project types, with public appeal, especially those that 
could represent long-term solutions to reliance on fossil fuels (Karsenty 2008). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, three types of issues feature most prominently in constraining small-scale forest 
holders in the Philippines from engaging fully across the carbon market value chain. These 
constraints imply that small-scale forest holders typically: (1) lack sufficient technical skills 
across the gamete of forestry, commercial and legal compliance requirements to engage in 
carbon markets; (2) cannot afford the transaction costs involved in engaging in carbon 
markets; and (3) lack marketing skills and access to networks of buyers that would facilitate 
maximum revenue gain from carbon sales. Future research is needed into whether and how 
these issues can be addressed through Philippine government forest policy.  
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